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INTRODUCTION
JP1-02 defines information superiority as "that degree of dominance in the information domain which permits the conduct of operations without effective opposition." 1 Accordingly, Joint Vision 2010 states that Information superiority will require both offensive and defensive information warfare (IW). Offensive information warfare will degrade or exploit an adversary's collection or use of information. It will include both traditional methods, such as a precision attack to destroy an adversary's command and control capability, as well as nontraditional methods such as electronic intrusion into an information and control network to convince, confuse, or deceive enemy military decision makers. 2 Furthermore, Joint Vision 2020 interjects that "the creation of information superiority is not an end in itself."
3 At the same time the end of the Cold War has created a power shift and a redistribution of authority among states, markets, and society itself. 4 This shift has placed the non-state actor firmly on the world stage. Presently, the United States is engaged in lowintensity operations against terrorist and insurgency groups. Along with these groups, nonstate actors and transnational organizations maintain a fundamental reliance at some level on computer and information technology. With continued U.S. hegemony and the potential emergence of another superpower still decades away, similar threats are now more the norm rather than the exception. The purpose of this paper is to examine the effectiveness of information operations (IO), specifically computer network attack (CNA), against non-state adversaries using key facets of operational art as criteria for measuring its success.
Synchronizing the effects of CNA with more traditional forms of kinetic attacks, as well as other instruments of national power, permits the United States to achieve its political and military objectives at a reduced cost. While there is an extensive body of knowledge about CNA at the classified level, this paper examines the topic strictly from an unclassified viewpoint.
WHAT ARE INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND CNA?
"'Information operations' are actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems, while defending one's own information and information systems. IO 
VULNERABILITY OF NON-STATE ACTORS
The computer and telecommunications revolution of the past twenty years has given rise to the non-state actor on a global level and has precipitated the decline of the non-state operations it must continue to integrate less conventional, non-kinetic forms of attack in conjunction with more traditional forms of attack to shape the battlespace and achieve the desired effects. Before the desired effects of CNA can be discussed in detail, an understanding of the two broad categories of computer networks is required. The first category is an information system, which includes databases, documents, web pages, and email. In contrast, the second broad type of information system is an infrastructure-control system, which could include power, chemical, or water plants, integrated air defense systems, and robots on a manufacturing line. 15 While the effect of attacking an information system is usually aimed at a human decision maker, the effect of attacking an infrastructure-control system is more conventional because the desired effect is to disable or destroy a physical object. As discussed in the previous section, non-state adversaries and terrorists are heavily reliant on information systems, so while the intended target of CNA is an information system, the ultimate effect is directed at people. Dr. Dan Kuehl, a professor and leading advocate of IO at the National Defense University stated, "The ultimate objective must be focused on the human. It might be a decision maker, but it might also be 5 million inhabitants of a 20 While it is apparent that the target of CNA is the information and computer systems used by our adversaries, it is important not to forget that the desired effect is directed against human decision-makers at all levels of war.
ANALYSIS IN TERMS OF OPERATIONAL ART
The effectiveness of CNA is measured in a variety of ways by the attacker in order to determine whether the activities being conducted are having the desired effect as they relate to the overall mission and objective. General criteria for measuring the effectiveness of CNA should include the following-relation to the objective, measurable results, and timeliness. depth in this qualitative analysis. While it can be hard to isolate events and ascertain a direct cause-effect relationship between CNA actions and measured effects, the criteria I have selected serves as a good benchmark from which to measure the usefulness of CNA against non-state enemies.
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Objective. As with any form of attack including CNA, a clear objective should be determined before commencing operations. JP1-02 defines objective as "clearly defined, decisive, and attainable goals towards which every military operation should be directed."
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Dissecting the objective into its three core elements: defined, decisive, and attainable provides a good indication to its application to CNA and its use against non-state adversaries. CNA operations must be clearly defined before being executed; that is, is the attack focused on a command and control capability like email or is it directed against a recruitment or propaganda tool like a website? Next, can CNA be decisive? This is a far more difficult effect to evaluate. Unlike a CNA attack against a nation-state, where actions may focus to compromise or defeat an infrastructure-control system, the primary target in a CNA attack against a terrorist group or non-state opponent is a human audience and the decisions they make. So, while it is argued that CNA can be complementary in its battlespace shaping effects, it is less likely to be decisive by itself against a non-state enemy. Finally, is CNA a realistic and attainable option for an operational commander? This goal is more problematic when targeted against a non-state adversary. Because non-state opponents lack a readily exploitable fixed infrastructure, the challenge lies in one's ability to target effectively the computer and information systems in use by terrorist organizations and non-state enemies.
To ensure that the right target is selected so that the appropriate effect is achieved, a robust 
Timeliness.
A key goal for all operations is that they be conducted in a timely manner to ensure that initiative and momentum are maintained. Measuring the effectiveness of CNA operations may require rapid feedback in an effort to remain inside an adversary's decision cycle. With respect to CNA and a non-state opponent's lack of computer infrastructure, it is essential that CNA and its assessment be conducted in an expeditious manner to ensure the desired effect is achieved; that is, the decision-maker is influenced in such a way that he modifies or changes his operations. If a terrorist group suspects the computer system they are using is compromised, they will likely change systems and could change the manner in which they conduct their operations. The impact of such a change could have profound effects and would require a substantial reinvestment of intelligence resources to achieve the preconditions necessary to make CNA possible. As an example, a terrorist group is attempting to influence public sentiment through the use of an inflammatory website. In this case, a narrow window of opportunity exists for CNA to be used effectively. Despite these restrictions, when correctly used and with the proper intelligence assets capable of selecting the proper targets, CNA can serve as a valuable and timely option against non-state adversaries.
Synergy.
A goal of any operation is to synchronize and integrate actions across both time and space, culminating in achieving the objective as quickly as possible. Both symmetric and asymmetric actions are executed in order to capitalize on friendly strengths and exploit an enemy's weakness. 25 CNA can provide some unique asymmetrical advantages when combating a non-state actor. By virtue of their dispersed nature, non-state actors have a susceptible dependency on computer systems since they rely heavily on these systems to conduct command and control. As an illustration, a geographically dispersed terrorist network may use a website to post critical information regarding future operations. With the proper intelligence resources that can confirm the authenticity and use of the website, CNA could be used to deny access to the website temporarily, thus delaying intended terrorist operations, and permitting other forms of IO or other dimensions of combat power like firepower and maneuver to be employed. So, while not necessarily decisive in itself, CNA can augment these other operations to achieve an operation's objective.
Balance. "Balance is the maintenance of the force, its capabilities, and its operations in such a manner as to contribute to freedom of action and responsiveness."
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While friendly forces attempt to preserve a balance of their capabilities across all dimensions of combat power, IO and, specifically, CNA is an ideal tool to disrupt an adversarial non-state opponent's balance by unexpectedly attacking crucial vulnerabilities. Financing operations are a key aspect of any organization, and while more traditional instruments of national power, like economic sanctions or embargoes, might be effective against a conventional nation-state over a period of several years, it is far more difficult to apply these techniques against a non-state adversary. Nevertheless, there is a certain reliance by non-state enemies on computer and information systems to solicit, move, and disburse funds. In conjunction with more traditional economic forms of power, CNA can effectively disrupt or deny critical financial transactions and could be leveraged as an intelligence gathering tool to identify funding sources and expenditures that could be exploited further by other means.
Leverage. Achieving, preserving, and exploiting advantages across all aspects of combat power characterize leverage. 27 CNA must capitalize on its asymmetric advantages against a non-state adversary throughout the operational factors of space and time to provide a 26 Ibid., Ibid., decisive advantage. The uncertainty that CNA brings to bear upon an opponent can influence his entire decision-making process, causing the terrorist leaders to make illogical choices that are vulnerable to exploitation. In this manner CNA can also serve as a deterrent prior to the commencement of hostilities by causing a terrorist leader to delay or modify his actions in a counterproductive fashion. Thus, CNA allows a commander to leverage other forces and capabilities to accomplish his desired objective.
Simultaneity and Depth. Synchronizing operations continuously throughout time
and space can produce devastating results against an adversary. The enemy's ability to make rational decisions is negatively impacted by these overwhelming and synchronized operations. CNA contributes to this irrational decision-making by generating confusion and uncertainty in the enemy's actions. Additionally, CNA can be applied at all levels of war. Actions initiated at the tactical level could have effects at the operational or possibly at the strategic level. CNA could be planned at the tactical level as part of a psychological operation to support a tactical engagement, but the resultant effect might cause hesitancy in terrorist leaders that lead to operational mistakes. An example of this indecisiveness might be accelerating the timeline for a bombing. The hastened bombing might result in reduced or unintended casualties; that is, a greater number of locals, whom the non-state opponent is trying to influence positively, are killed. While not vital in itself, CNA can be effective in both simultaneity and depth to attain the desired outcome against a non-state actor.
CHALLENGES AND RECOMMENDATIONS
There remain several challenges that must be overcome to increase CNA's effectiveness and realize its full potential against non-state adversaries. After careful review, three recommendations are proposed: improved intelligence, better training and awareness, and proper assurance testing and deconfliction. An additional challenge, however, accompanying these recommendations, is that CNA must be conducted within an established legal and ethical framework. Collectively, these recommendations can help improve the effectiveness of CNA and make it a more potent weapon against non-state actors.
Improved Intelligence. A common theme that permeates most of this analysis is the need for proper intelligence applied throughout all phases of CNA. From the initial phases of targeting through to the final phases of battle damage assessment, it is crucial that the appropriate intelligence assets are properly resourced for this task. These assets could vary widely depending on the specific type of operation, but may include human intelligence, signals intelligence, or electronics intelligence. Unfortunately, current collection and intelligence methods were designed to support more conventional kinetic attacks. While improvements are being made in the intelligence field to address these shortcomings, it is imperative that intelligence capabilities related to non-traditional forms of warfare, like CNA, be properly prioritized and resourced. The intelligence process must also be accelerated to maximize the synergy and leverage that CNA brings to the fight. For CNA to be effective, a rapid and robust intelligence mechanism must be implemented to provide the timely feedback necessary to ensure the objectives are met. Steps are being taken in the right direction with STRATCOM developing a joint integrative analysis and planning capability (JIAPC) to provide targeting, planning, and analysis in a timely manner in support of combatant commander IO requirements, but continuing funding difficulties and the complexities of interagency coordination will continue to make improved intelligence a challenge.
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Better Training and Awareness. Enhanced training and awareness go hand in hand.
As an IO core capability, CNA is still in its infancy. The proliferation and advancement of computer systems in the last decade alone indicate that CNA has not reached maturity. The skill set required to conduct CNA is both wide-ranging and highly perishable. As new hardware and software platforms emerge, operators must be more diligent and creative in their efforts to exploit these systems. Compounding the problem is the lack of fixed infrastructure inherent to the non-state enemies and terrorist groups. While Joint Task ForceComputer Network Operations (JTF-CNO) is taking active measures to ensure that a highly capable and professional force is prepared to conduct CNA, the changing complexities of the discipline, which include new software operating systems, new hardware platforms, and emerging networking protocols, require increased attention and effort.
Increased awareness by the operational commander is another aspect of CNA that needs to be addressed. The apparent lack of CNA can be credited to the fact that many senior leaders are unaware of CNA's capabilities. Familiar with the available arsenal of kinetic weapons, they are unlikely to employ CNA unless they are educated about the potential effects of this weapon. Similarly, if CNA planning is kept compartmentalized, it is improbable that in time of crisis its use will be approved. IO capabilities, and especially CNA, must not only be taught, but must be emphasized at all educational levels. Only after senior leaders gain a thorough understanding of CNA will its potential be fully realized. may cause unintended consequences that require special consideration during both the planning and execution phase of operations. From an ethical standpoint, the situation is equally unclear. While CNA is obviously an act of force, CNA by itself is not morally wrong. Its moral connotation originates from the circumstances of its use, particularly the manner of attack and the target. 31 While the use of CNA against non-state enemies can be both legal and ethical in nature, legal experts need to participate fully in the planning and execution of CNA operations to ensure that legitimacy is maintained.
CONCLUSION
With the United States engaged in counter-insurgency operations against terrorist groups, synchronizing the effects of CNA with more traditional forms of kinetic attacks, as well as other instruments of national power, permits the United States to achieve its political and military objectives at a reduced cost. The dependency of non-state actors on computer systems will only grow as information systems become more pervasive in under-developed nations. CNA, while typically not decisive in itself, can help shape the battlespace and serve as an effective instrument against non-state adversaires. The effects of CNA can bring synergy, balance, leverage, simultaneity and depth to an operation while helping to achieve the objective in a timely manner with measurable results. Military leaders looking to plan and execute CNA operations against non-state opponents need to focus on improved intelligence, better training and awareness, and proper assurance testing and deconfliction to improve the chance of success. Planners also need to be careful to ensure that CNA is conducted within a legal and ethical framework. 
